The Return of Global Sisterhood? The Transnational Journey of the 4B Movement on TikTok
Jinsook Kim / Emory University
After the US presidential election last year, Western news outlets began to publish a significant number of articles about the 4B movement in South Korea (hereafter Korea) and its meaning for American women (Poggi 2024; Treisman 2024). “B” (bi) in Korean means “no” or “not to do,” and 4B refers to rejecting four things: bihon (no marriage), bichulsan (no childbirth), biyeonae (no dating), and bisex (no heterosexual sex). The term 4B, largely a phenomenon involving a subset of feminists, started to gain traction around 2017-18 through social media and women-centered online communities in Korea. While it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when and by whom it was coined,[1] the discourse traces back to the online feminist group Megalia and young women’s growing discontent with both misogynistic men and the reproduction of a heterosexual and patriarchal way of life.
@wtfaleisa Replying to @user9720585462941 ♬ original sound – wtfaleisa
4B stands in opposition to pro-natalist state policies, the dominant patriarchal and misogynistic culture, and the rampant gender-based violence in Korea. It reflects collective visions for independent and autonomous lives for women beyond the heteropatriarchal life script and societal expectations of hegemonic femininity, which reduce women to mere tools of heterosexual reproduction, and resistance to the increasing structural discrimination and violence against women (Gong 2021; Lee and Jeong 2021; Kang, Kim, and Jung 2020). In this sense, 4B is symptomatic of the resurgence of feminism and the changing gender dynamics in Korea, though the collective avoidance of marriage or childbirth there is much broader than 4B. Thus, referring to 4B as a “movement” may be an overstatement, despite its frequent usage with this meaning in public discourse and academic articles, since 4B has not generated a mainstream or organized activity. Interestingly, 4B has become better known outside Korea than within it, gaining traction as a global feminist movement. In 2020, a later development of 4B, the 6B4T movement,[2] became popular in China, where it was labeled a “radical” feminist movement from Korea (Cheng 2023). Since April 2024, there has been a sudden surge of Anglophone users introducing 4B on TikTok as a representative feminist movement from Korea and encouraging women in other countries to join the movement.
The practice of border-crossing reveals complex and unequal power relations among various forms of feminism (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). In the 1990s, transnational feminism emerged as both a critique of and alternative to global feminism’s white, middle-class, Western-centric perspective epitomized by the notion of universal sisterhood. Previous research has tended to focus on the flow of feminist campaigns from the West to other parts of the world and how non-Western feminists translate, navigate, and negotiate these ideas in their own political and cultural contexts (Mendes 2015; Han 2016). While this body of research sheds light on the Western-centric and colonially biased white savior complex arising from the unequal power dynamics in the transnational flows of feminism (Higgs 2015; Maxfield 2016), it has not proved equal to the task of challenging the very idea that feminism originates in the West and spreads to non-Western regions. 4B is thus an intriguing case study since it originated in Korea, has spread worldwide, and appears to call for new feminist solidarity and global sisterhood. The aim of this essay is to reflect critically on and intervene in the complex discursive landscape that is emerging as 4B gains global traction, particularly through digital platforms, and explore the potential and limitations of such transfer of translation and dialogs about it.
Western media outlets and TikTokers tend to conceive of 4B as a radical, bold, and popular feminist movement in Korea. For example, The Cut magazine declared “The women of South Korea’s 4B movement aren’t fighting the patriarchy—they’re leaving it behind entirely.” The dominant narrative that “4B is such a powerful and popular feminist movement that Korea has the world’s lowest fertility rate because of it” is also widespread in popular TikTok videos (see Figure 1). In this discourse, Korea’s gender dynamics and feminist movements are often depicted in a flattened and dehistoricized way, without acknowledging the complex social and political contexts of the declining birth rate and the popularization of feminism. While the ahistorical understanding and Othering of non-Western women is not new, Anglophone TikTokers have not simply attempted to “save the inferior others” but have actively advocated for the adoption of 4B practices in the US. The rising awareness of sexual violence and gender inequality, particularly following the #MeToo movement, the overturning of Roe v. Wade, and the increasing threats to reproductive rights have heightened the perception of heterosexual relationships as risky, especially for young women (Kaur 2024; Poggi 2024), perhaps convincing American users to express their support for the core tenets, especially since Trump’s re-election. However, despite their ostensibly positive intention to celebrate and learn from 4B, this simplified understanding perpetuates reductive orientalist views of non-Western societies and women as mere sources of inspiration, again ignoring their history and complexity.
On the other hand, as 4B went viral on TikTok, the increasing criticisms revealed that some users have begun to challenge the mainstream media representation of it by suggesting alternative narratives for engaging with it. For instance, a Korean woman in her 20s posted a video claiming that 4B is not mainstream in Korea but rather part of an “extremist radical online feminist ideology.” She asserted that she and her friends still date and desire marriage. As the debate raged on TikTok about whether 4B is a mainstream or a fringe movement in Korea, some commentators further criticized the hyper-visibility and sensationalization of 4B as a reflection of Western-centric and white feminist perspectives, raising questions regarding which voices speaking about gender equality and feminism in Korea are “authentic.” Notably, these TikTokers, despite being a minority, navigate the challenges of transnational and cross-cultural understanding, thereby raising critical questions about ethical engagement with various forms of feminism. The discursive debates on TikTok show that the process of translation and representation reveals the ongoing struggle over privilege and difference in feminist digital spaces and the complexity of sisterhood and solidarity.
@anna.lee.jy thanks to my friend @Annie Nova for making this video! The 4b movement is not as big in Korea as y’all think it is #korea #seoul #4bmovement #livinginkorea #southkorea ♬ original sound – Anna Lee – anna.lee.jy
Therefore, it is difficult to simply celebrate 4B as a successful example of transnational feminism traveling from the non-West to the West. Instead, the key questions concern which feminist ideas successfully travel and why as well as what the effects of such visibility may have on local and transnational feminist politics. Among Korean feminists, 4B has been strongly associated with radfems, self-proclaimed “radical feminists” who advocate essentialist and separatist politics for “biological women” (Kim 2021). In fact, many users who identify themselves as proponents of 4B on X/Twitter are trans-exclusionary or sex-worker-exclusionary radical feminists or so-called gender-critical feminists. The tenet of avoiding any relationships with men, based on rigid gender binarism, has often served as a basis for attacks on trans women that frame them as a threat to (“biological”) women’s safety. Although some radical feminists in the late 1960s excluded trans people, not all were anti-trans, whereas contemporary TERFs (trans-exclusionary radical feminists) adopt “radical” feminist language to advance anti-trans politics (Kim 2024). Despite these limitations and in the absence of a clear definition, Anglophone media and academic discourses have characterized 4B as a representative “radical” feminist campaign. Korean queer feminists have already expressed concern that the heightened interest in 4B may “feed and revive the most regressive part” of the concept, including amplifying anti-trans politics (López 2024). Especially given the ongoing debates and struggles among Korean feminists, this problematic and dismissive elevation of 4B to serve as the representative face of Korean feminism risks silencing the decades-long efforts of queer and intersectional feminists to combat transphobia and cisnormativity and grasp gender through intersecting axes of power within a geopolitical context. In contrast with 4B, many Anglophone readers may be unaware that BDS Korea (Palestine Peace & Solidarity) and solidarity movements with Palestinians in Korea have been primarily organized and led by feminist activists on the ground.[3]
While 4B crystallized within the unique Korean social and cultural context, the development of trans-exclusionary feminism in Korea and the popularity of 4B need to be understood in the context of the rise of populist and anti-trans politics worldwide (Bassi and LaFleur 2022; Pearce, Erikainen, and Vincent 2020; Yamada 2022). This is not to claim that 4B is inherently transphobic or that all women who sympathize with 4B are necessarily trans-exclusionary. Rather, trans-exclusionary feminism in Korea has been shaped in relation to that in Western countries such as the US and the UK (Kim 2024), and Western offshoots of 4B similarly exhibit transphobia. For instance, the “West 4B movement” YouTube channel states that “The West 4B Movement is a RADICAL FEMINIST SEPARATIST MOVEMENT FOR BIOLOGICAL WOMEN ONLY” (emphasis in original). The deployment of “female victimhood” is central to understanding the rise of this reactionary feminism, as are neoliberal notions of survival and the platformization of pain, that is, the broadcasting, amplification, and monetization of vulnerability through social media platforms in the era of digital neoliberalism (Chouliaraki 2020; Phipps 2021).
In this sense, the transnational circulation and popularity of 4B may signify a return to the old concept of global sisterhood in terms of emphasizing commonality rooted in female suffering and victimhood resulting from patriarchal violence. The rise of reactionary feminism, however, once again narrows and homogenizes the meaning of “women” and women’s lives by prioritizing biological women as the most oppressed class while disregarding differences, intersectional privileges, and power dynamics among women across diverse contexts. As the history of feminism reminds us, it is necessary to remain vigilant against the invocation of universal sisterhood through simplistic identification and sympathy, which can only be achieved by erasing and excluding marginalized Others. The transnational journey of 4B demonstrates that border-crossing feminism is neither straightforward nor unproblematic but, rather, is a process often fraught with challenges and contradictions. Therefore, instead of simply celebrating the diffusion of feminist ideas, it is crucial to collaborate across borders so as to understand better the impacts and risks of the transnational circulation of 4B and its adaptation to diverse contexts. Through such efforts, the potential of feminist cultural translation, dialogs, and solidarity beyond simplified notions of sisterhood can be realized.
Image Credits:
- Figure 1. Image by Kaitlin Burns
- Figure 2. A TikTok video on the 4B Movement by @wtfalesia
- Figure 3. “The 4B movement is not as big in Korea as y’all think it is.” By @anna.lee.jy
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Footnotes:- Some TikTokers and media reports incorrectly trace its origins to the book Kim Ji-young, Born 1982 or the 2016 Gangnam Station murder case. Some even claim, without solid evidence, that 4B has as many as 50,000 followers. [↩]
- In addition to the original four nos, 6B includes the idea of women helping each other and rejecting sexist products, and 4T refers to rejecting strict beauty standards, religion, idols, and otaku culture. In China, 6B4T gained significant attention online but was eventually censored by the Chinese government on various digital platforms (Li 2021). [↩]
- As of April 2024, 854 individuals and 71 organizations had signed the statement on the “Korean Feminists’ Declaration for Ending the Genocide and Colonization against Palestine.” [↩]